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There are, indeed, an infinite number of worlds for us to fall in love with, each 
accessible to us through a distinctive intimation of the sacred, each governed by the 
unique other as its center, each constituting a distinctive hierophany. Even as it pierces 
the heart with its heterogeneity, each of these worlds awakens our repressed longing to 
spend ourselves completely and profligately, in a way analogous to worship. Each of 
them has the capacity to touch us with its promise of inexhaustible plenitude. […] 
What if all these worlds are only so many blind alleys promising everything but 
leading nowhere? If we enter wholly inside any one of them, and lose ourselves in it, it 
will seem to be a complete universe from which nothing has been left out. But does not 
the very fact that there is an inside and an outside to each of these worlds suggest that 
none of them can be as all-encompassing as it promises to be? In surrendering to it 
because it liberates us from the ordinary, are we in danger of being imprisoned anew? 
(Jerome Miller 84-85) 
 
Enchantment, dis-enchantment, and re-enchantment are tropes well-known when 
it comes to thinking about religion/spirituality and the environment; but what do these 
words really mean? Enchantment comes from the Latin incantare, to chant in (upon), or 
cantare, to sing (upon). As such, it has associations with magic spells: to sing upon or 
make magical the world, a life, a person, or not. Are we talking about the desire to re-
sing, re-chant the world? Are we longing to make the world magical again, to see it 
beyond the categories of reason, as we would a song? If so, do we as humans perform as 
"composers" on the "instruments" of the world? Or, is nature the song that we merely 
help sing? How should we understand this “nature” that was once enchanted, has 
become dis-enchanted, and now needs re-enchantment?  
We have been here before … caught in this same refrain.2 Carolyn Merchant’s 
Reinventing Eden (2004) offers a critique of this refrain: namely, that somehow the 
origin of life was pure, that we human beings have caused nature to fall, and that, as a 
result, we are now stuck in either narratives of decline toward an ultimate demise, or in 
progressive narratives of recovering what has been lost. However, what if this song of 
origin, loss, and recovery proves no longer capable of keeping time, or of making sense 
                                                       
1 I want to thank the anonymous reviewers for helping me to make this a better article. Their refractions 
on this article led me down lines of flight I would have otherwise missed.  
2 I mean to invoke Deleuze and Guattari’s use of “the refrain” in A Thousand Plateaus: “we call a 
refrain any aggregate of matters of expression that draws a territory and develops into territorial 
motifs and landscapes” (323). What we need to remember is that “the refrain remains a formula evoking 
a character or landscape, instead of itself constituting a rhythmic character of melodic landscape” (349). 
Hence we require a new song, with new refrains as I argue here. I thank Sam Mickey and Elizabeth 
McAnally for our many fruitful conversations on Deleuze and Guattari. I also thank the John Templeton 
Award for Theological Promise and the Wabash Center for Teaching and Learning for providing some of 
the funding that enabled me to complete this article. 
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of matter and making the senses matter? What if now we need to fashion new songs, 
new compositions that take us beyond this old refrain, beyond loss and recovery? 
Maybe it is time we begin to think anew, to see where we can go beyond the discourse 
of enchantment, and to ponder what such a territory and the path leading to it might 
both look like?  
 Enchantment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment constitute one group of 
terms among many that reinforce the idea that humans are somehow apart from nature, 
living in a linear history, and that we enjoy ultimate power over nature. In other words, 
the language of enchantment has done little to take us out of the Modern understanding 
of what it means to be a human living within the world. This Modern view suggests a 
demarcation between that which is human and the rest of the natural world. In general, 
agency in this equation lies entirely with (some) humans (women and “primitive” or 
“deviant” “others” are often left out of or made to matter less). Whether we are talking 
about improving, saving, or re-enchanting nature, the Modern understanding of humans 
as the locus of value and/or agency is maintained. What might shift us out of this 
discursive network of the modern anthropos and into one of what Gayatri Spivak might 
call a planetary anthropos (71-102)? That is what this short article aims to explore. 
“Enchantment” language in reference to nature will never move us out of the discourse 
of Modernity/Postmodernity because it depends upon the modern distinctions of 
human history and nature, culture and nature, God/divinity/the sacred and the world; all 
of these distinctions miss the critically constructive process by which humans fashion 
meanings from within ecological and social contexts.  
 The language of “Enchantment” in reference to nature fails, I would argue, for 
three reasons. First, it gives the Modern world too much credit for actually “dis-
enchanting” nature instead of recognizing Modern, “dead nature,” as one form of nature 
among many. Thus, it fails to account for the fact that “mechanism” itself also works as 
an enchantment, a song if you will, of the natural-cultural world. Put another way, the 
“Death of Nature” represents more a truth regime, an epistemic score that humans live 
into and tend towards rather than a definitive ontological moment in the historical past. 
In fact, the more we sing the song of mechanism, the more we move toward “the Death 
of Nature.” In a way similar to Bruno Latour’s argument that “we have never been 
modern,” the world has never, in this account, been dis-enchanted: 
 
Driving away the mountain gods does not reveal the mountain to be an inert place 
devoid of any sacred power. Rather it reveals the mountain to be harbouring a new form 
of sacred power, that of coal. Coal is not here simple ‘stuff’, but during the Great Leap 
Forward was the means by which China would achieve its Great Leap Forward into the 
future. It was, in effect, the numinous substance that was essential in the concoction of a 
new elixir of immortality: steel. (James Miller 116) 
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Miller’s quote highlights the fact that, for a people living prior to the Industrial 
Revolution and to Modern Medicine, where life was much shorter and taken by disease, 
famine, etc., the power of transforming nature was indeed an enchantment of the world. 
Much has been written on the differences and similarities between Modern science and 
magic, but both are magical, enchanting.  
Second, enchantment, dis-enchantment, and re-enchantment fall into the trap of 
foundationalism (and the place-based ethics/aesthetics derived from the latter). In other 
words, arguing that the world is enchanted or not remains tied to ethico-political 
interests intent on proving that a certain way of interacting with “nature” is, well, 
“natural,” or “right” and “good.” Though I am mainly speaking of Western and Christian 
forms of foundationalism that would identify anything as natural, God-given, or a 
priori, I also hold that wherever it manifests, such foundationalism “backgrounds” the 
co-constructive process of nature and can lead to oppressive politics.3 As Haraway 
notes, this “god-trick” of foundationalism only recapitulates hierarchy, and thus puts an 
end to dialogue (Simians, Cyborgs, and Women 189). It has been used as much to claim 
“purity” as to claim “perversity,” and both designations generate violence. The vision of 
nature as “sacred,” “pure,” and “enchanted” can also lead to the reification of one’s idea 
of nature and, therefore, once again to the “death of nature.”4 Thus, I argue, the move 
from an ontological-based ethics toward an ethic based upon aesthetic persuasion trips 
up the logic by which foundational categories yield domination and violence.  
 Third and finally, the discourse of enchantment, dis-enchantment, and re-
enchantment falls into the “Western” trap of linear thinking: we are in a narrative that 
moves from Eden to a fall, and then to a re-capturing of paradise or ultimate demise. 
What if, rather, we thought of time as rhizomatic (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus 3-25) or “collecting and re-collecting” (Latour, Politics of Nature 53-90)? In 
this respect, pasts and futures are contained and mixed up in the present. There is no 
succession of pure moments of history disconnected from the other, but all of time is 
wrapped up in different conglomerations of the present. The present moment coincides 
more with the flow of time rather than with some ontological unit, so that “the totality 
of the universe resemble[s] a ‘pond of matter in which there exist different flows and 
waves’” (Deleuze, The Fold 5).  
 Given these three main critiques, a planetary environmental aesthetic, based 
upon a radical notion of immanence and paying attention to the sensibilities of 
                                                       
3 The notion of “backgrounding” comes from Val Plumwood (Environmental Culture 104). Though she 
contends elsewhere that giving up “nature” is problematic (“The Concept of a Cultural Landscape,” and 
“Toward a Progressive Naturalism”), I will argue in this piece that this is mostly based upon her 
assumption that Post-Modernity critiques the category of “nature” without critiquing “humanism.” 
4 Here I am reminded of the sacred Ganges that could not be polluted if not venerated by humans, or of 
the wilderness idea of “nature” (without humans) that both removes people from nature and sections off 
parts of it as sacred in the form of national parks. 
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movement and change, may be more persuasive when dealing with contemporary 
natural-cultural issues such as global climate change. This shift in thinking re-situates the 
argument of enchanted or not, an ontological if not metaphysical debate, within the 
relational and ethical task of co-fashioning planetary realities (or regimes of truth) that 
we want to live towards. After a brief critique of the transcendent language of 
“enchantment”, it is indeed relevant and essential to move on to the constructive project 
of fashioning an environmental aesthetic. For the act of fashioning, if anything, reveals 
the incredible importance of aesthetic persuasion. Most especially, this act can help 
shine a light on the fact that all meaning-making projects, even those claiming some sort 
of transcendence or objectivity such as Modernity, are made from very specific natural-
cultural contexts and return to shape those contexts. In other words, fashioning language 
highlights the co-constructed assemblages of bodies and of what we call “natural,” 
thereby focusing on movement rather than stasis. It is, precisely, on the pace of 
movement rather than on the impossible choice of movement vs. stasis (or inertia) that a 
planetary aesthetic lens should focus our attention. The persuasive power of Modern 
thinking, as I will argue, lies in its denial that it is one of many fashionings. In denying 
its own historical contexts, Modern Thought (including Modern Science) covers over 
the fact that it amounts, in large part, to the continuation of the persuasive power of a 
transcendent monotheism in which God and Revelation are replaced with Reason and 
Natural Laws. Such covering places Modern Science in a position of authority over and 
against many other forms of knowledge, often referred to as “traditional ecological 
knowledge,” as if Modern Science and other Modern modes of thinking were not just 
one form of enchantment among many.  
 
Modern Nature as One among Many 
 
How could we be capable of disenchanting the world, when every day our laboratories 
and our factories populate the world with hundreds of hybrids stranger than those of the 
day before?  (Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 115). 
 
In his book, Nous n'avons jamais été modernes (1991), Bruno Latour develops the idea 
that the very notion of Modernity relies on the distinction between “nature” and 
“culture” (We Have Never Been Modern 104). Throughout, he argues that in reality, one 
side of the nature-culture continuum is always “backgrounded” (Plumwood, 
Environmental Culture 104) and subsequently used as the transcendent foundation for 
the opposite side of the continuum. In his words, “Modern” designates two different 
sets of practices: that of translation (which is backgrounded) and of purification (which 
is asserted). Translation “creates mixtures between entirely new types of beings, 
hybrids of nature and culture,” while purification “creates two entirely distinct 
ontological zones: that of human beings on the one hand; that of nonhumans on the 
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other” (Latour, We Have Never Been Modern 10-11). Modernity backgrounds the 
practice of translation which would show that we are all, as Donna Haraway asserts, 
cyborgs, or mixtures of nature-cultures, human-nonhuman, self-other, past-present, 
ideas-matter, etc. (Haraway, Simians 149-182). The process of backgrounding occurs 
through positing foundations for knowledge/epistemology and being/ontology in nature, 
society, God, a priori ideas, or other sui generis “god-tricks”5 (a point which will be 
returned to in the next section). This backgrounding of the translation processes through 
transcendent foundations results in purification, i.e. the very goal that the project of 
Modernity claims for itself. In other words, alleging that is solely a process of 
purification and nothing else, Modern epistemology posits that all reality can be ordered 
in non-continuous terms of human/non-human, culture/nature, modern/pre-modern, 
self/other, God/world, and so on. Moderns, as Henri Bergson noted about both 
Rationalists and Empiricists, “mistake partial notations [or categories/ or what Latour 
calls quasi-subjects/objects] for real parts” (Bergson 34). 
 This quick and "dirty" analysis of Latour’s work matters in this discussion 
because the language of enchantment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment fits squarely 
within the Modern “problem.” The only way we can think of nature as “dis-enchanted” 
is if we "buy" into the Modern partitioning-off, separation, and backgrounding of the 
links between nature-cultures, and create “nature” as a pure category available for 
exploitation by the Modern Mind, especially the Western Modern mind according to 
which many other cultures/peoples are placed closer to the category of “nature.” In 
other words, claiming the world to be “Modern” or “Post-Modern” imposes upon the 
whole globe categories from within a specific historical trajectory.  
Val Plumwood argues that this process creates three types of categorical 
mistakes. The first, which she calls “naturalizing 1,” refers to the process by which (in 
this case) Modernity is equated with “natural” in a way that hides its own construction. 
The second error Plumwood sees is “over-humanizing,” whereby Modern Reason 
assumes that the rest of the natural world operates by its own logic. The third 
categorical mistake, or “naturalizing 2,” is the process by which other humans who 
operate from a different way of understanding the world get naturalized or placed into a 
context that is “closer to nature” (Plumwood, “The Concept of a Cultural Landscape” 
132-133; “Toward a Progressive Naturalism” 38-39). Plumwood contends that we still 
ought to keep the category of nature, but does not sufficiently address how "keeping 
nature” must to some extent maintain the separation of humans from it. Her argument is 
that Postmoderns deconstruct “nature” without deconstructing humanism. She writes, 
“Humanism must come to terms with an affirmation of the denied nonhuman side of the 
                                                       
5 The term is Donna Haraway's and designates these foundational assertions that end dialogue and 
conversation (The Companion Species Manifesto 25). 
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dominant culture that is labeled nature if it is ever to find a satisfactory form for its 
human application” (Plumwood, “Toward a Progressive Naturalism” 30). She somehow 
misses the works of Bruno Latour, who calls for doing away with both nature and 
culture. Likewise, she overlooks those of Donna Haraway, who always argues for 
blurring the boundaries of human-nature-technology precisely because this challenges 
the agential and value superiority of humans vis-à-vis the rest of the natural world. If 
we hold on to some sort of “nature” as free of human influence, or free of the influence 
of human meaning-making, then we also hold on to a transcendent place whereby a 
whole hierarchy of oppressions can be enforced. As Deborah Bird Rose notes, “It is 
essential that we not mistake an inability to hear for an absence of communication” from 
the rest of the natural world (Rose 183). At the same time, it is essential that we not 
mistake “hearing” with hearing the voice of raw nature unmediated by human 
experience. Such raw hearing, enchanting though it may be, does nothing to prevent the 
desire to then impose that one interpretation of “nature” over the face of the entire 
globe.  
 The language of “re-enchantment” does nothing to upset the Modern fallacy of 
separation between natures and cultures, or between non-human and human life. In fact, 
it buys into the separation by ignoring Latour’s assertion that we have never really been 
Modern. It assumes that “Modern” is something we have passed through that must be 
moved on from, perhaps in the form of Post-Modernity or in the form of a romantic 
reclamation of a “pre-Modern” enchanted nature. In doing so, it continues what I see as 
the violence of purification set about by the Modern project: the severance of humans 
from the rest of the natural world. Only now, humans are seen as the stewards or 
caretakers of a valuable nature rather than nature as merely instrumental to human 
means. This stewardship model can still lead to a colonizing approach to the non-
human, as critiques of colonial environmental practices have argued (see Adams and 
Mulligan). The projection of monological versions of what both “human” and “nature” 
are, result in violence toward the diversity of nature-cultures that actually exist. These 
monological visions do not question the hidden foundations that background the 
relations between humans and nature. 
 Foundationalism, as I am imagining it here is an epistemology in which there is 
thought to be a one-to-one correlation between a priori, intuited, sensed, reasoned, or 
revealed ideas and reality. Through these foundations, the eco-socio-historical 
contextuality of thought remains unacknowledged and becomes instead backgrounded, 
so that these foundations serve as “natural” or “universal.” They take the form of truth-
claims that cannot be questioned. These types of “truth claims are a way of closing 
down discussion, or ending critical dialogue, of invoking authoritarian standards” 
(Harding 145). These types of foundations are only made possible through the project 
of purification and backgrounding. Both Idealism and Materialism represent forms of 
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foundations, the former in Ideas/Revelation, the latter in Nature. These foundations, 
whether revealed a priori or “natural,” are just what is. In other words, the networks of 
nature-cultures in which knowledge is constructed get ignored, these “truths” then 
becoming self-evident as if they had been discovered ex nihilo. As such, they cannot be 
questioned but must be accepted as universal by everyone everywhere. This, in a 
nutshell, is the problem with the colonial episteme.  
 As Félix Guattari notes, “By their very essence, analytic cartographies extend 
beyond the existential territories to which they are assigned” (Guattari 40). In the 
colonial mind, the use of foundational thought solves the problem of the relationship 
between subject/object, or thought and its object, by projecting pure, transcendent 
categories onto the material world and backgrounding the remainder, the in-between, the 
relationship between categories. Deborah Bird Rose speaks of such a process as 
imposing the “year-zero” upon places in the process of colonization. In this process, 
“The left hand creates the tabula rasa [of the uncivilized] upon which the right hand 
will inscribe civilization” (Rose 62). Furthermore, in Politiques de la Nature (1999), 
Bruno Latour argues that this type of foundationalism serves to make nature apolitical. 
We must simply accept the way things are as dictated to us by the natural sciences or 
religious revelations, or categories provided by “the experts” (see Latour, Politics). Ideas 
of progress, getting closer to Reality, finding one’s “true nature” all play into such 
foundational ways of thinking. It is for this reason that critics such as Timothy Morton, 
Bruno Latour, Donna Haraway, and many others argue that we should do away with 
foundational categories of “nature” and “culture” and re-think our realities in some 
hybrid fashion. 
 The same type of foundationalism operates in an ethics of place. In order for a 
foundationally based ethic to work, there must be distinct ontological categories that 
define identities, as well as clear distinctions between species, between culture and 
nature, between the times of past, present, and future, etc. These transcendent places, 
then, are imposed upon the places of actual bodies, species, “nature”, and time. The 
language of enchantment falls within this ontological placed-based thinking. The 
sensibilities of “enchantment” language are focused on making claims about the 
place/space of whatever “Nature” means rather than on the sensibilities of the 
movement between categories (human/other animal, culture/nature, etc.) that construct 
the very meanings of nature into which we then begin to live. Place-based language tends 
simply to reify “nature” as a foundational category and, subsequently, humans as 
somehow still operating outside of the rest of the natural world. This desire for purity 
fits well with the very Modern notions that reality is “out there” and that with the right 
human attentiveness; it is waiting for us all to discover it. Many who want to hold on to 
nature, fail to take seriously the implications of maintaining that we can never extricate 
ourselves from our eco-historical contexts to some sort of "pure nature.” As such, a 
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focus on place and attachment to that place will never sufficiently avoid some sort of 
parochialism or understanding of what “nature” really is.  
What we need in forming a planetary aesthetic is critically-constructive dialogue 
that does not fall into an enforced notion of “enchanted” nature or place. Historically, 
ideas of “wild” nature (an enchanting idea of nature to be sure) led to the removal of 
peoples from lands as well as to the disruption of the complex relations between other 
humans and the lands and animals on which they subsisted. Very much in the same vein, 
any view of “enchanted” nature that backgrounds the “quasi” purity of its concepts of 
“nature” and “culture” runs the risk of mistaking a vision of nature for the vision of it 
and of imposing it globally. Such colonial approaches to nature maintain the idea both 
that the separation of humans and nature is ontologically justified, and that recognizing 
this distinction partakes of an inevitable, linear movement in the progress of history. 
The move from ontology to ethics participates in either the naturalistic (is to ought) or 
the supernaturalistic (ought to is) fallacy. Claiming that we can know what to do based 
upon what Nature tells us is the case—i.e. falling prey to the naturalistic fallacy—or 
claiming that Reason or intuited ideas give us our nature and ethics—i.e. embracing the 
supernaturalistic fallacy—these are both, in fact, monological projections that do not 
pay attention to the relations between nature-culture, ideas-matter, etc.6 Again, this 
ontological justification of ethics depends upon a totalization of reality through linear 
time.  
 
The Time of the Global, the Space-Time of the Planetary 
 
In his book, The Re-enchantment of Nature (2002), Alister McGrath writes: 
 
The basic theme of this book is simple. It suggests that we reclaim the idea of nature as 
God’s creation and act accordingly, bringing attitudes and actions into line with beliefs. 
[…] And more than this: we must see nature as a continual reminder and symbol of a 
future renewed creation, a world that we do not yet know but believe to lie over the 
horizons of our human existence. It is as if we are homesick for a lost Eden, longing for 
a fulfillment that we know lies ahead of us but have not yet found. The natural order, as 
God’s richly signed creation, is thus our place of living and hoping. (McGrath 184-185) 
 
Though his vision is clearly Christian, McGrath reveals the problem with the Modern 
concept of linear time which nourishes the language of enchantment, disenchantment, 
and re-enchantment. It goes something like this: creation has an origin and order that we 
can know, we have strayed from this origin and order, and we must regain it somehow. 
                                                       
6 Despite the contrast usually made between the naturalistic and supernaturalistic fallacies, I would argue 
that deriving ethics from either nature or ideals amounts, in each case, to a “supernaturalistic” fallacy: 
that is, both approaches participate in imposing ideas about nature as foundations for ethics. In actuality, 
the naturalistic fallacy, moving from what is to what ought to be, is impossible because “what is” is 
already always a projection rather than an ontological foundation.  
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Whether or not there is a God to ensure restoration, the linear project of history 
marches on (even in Marxism!). This understanding of time places (Modern) humans on 
the side of active history, whereas pre-Moderns and the non-human world get relegated 
on the side of passive nature. This progressive time draws sustenance from the 
separation of culture and nature (by backgrounding the relations therein) and from 
foundational thinking: there is a progressive movement from origin toward the present 
and toward the future (which actually boils down to a re-capturing of past inertia). This 
“tunnel of time” reifies all of reality in a (Euro-) linear time stretching from creation and 
fall to redemption; from primitive to civilized; from undeveloped to developed; from 
religious superstition to Enlightened science; from enchantment to disenchantment and 
re-enchantment; and a number of other linear tropes all coming out of the process of 
colonization.7 Whether it is based on belief in a restoration of creation by God, or faith 
in progress through science and the project of modernization, this understanding of time 
gives us our ethics. It is an ethic derived from ontology and metaphysics and must thus 
be adhered to rather than challenged or questioned. As Latour notes, “The notion of an 
irreversible arrow—progress or decadence—stems from an ordering of quasi-objects, 
whose proliferation the moderns cannot explain” (We Have Never Been Modern 73). In 
other words, this ethics depends upon the separation of the designations “culture” and 
“nature” without ever questioning whether or not the two are actually separate. It is 
always caught in the project of classifying human beings as “more” or “less” 
modernized, knowledgeable, and/or enlightened.  
 Just as Modernity supposedly dis-enchanted nature, now Post-Modernity or 
whatever comes next is responsible for “re-enchanting” nature. Another result of this 
linear time, with movement toward ultimate “progress” or “decline”, is that everything 
must be ordered in relation to its all-inclusiveness. In other words, we have here the 
problem of (w)holism: “Once being is thought in relation to the Whole or the One, the 
series of conditions are organized into a hierarchy on a transcendent plane—the 
organization of essences transcends the existence of individuals” (Goodchild 158-159). 
In such a scheme, categories and the ethics derived from them are continually dictated 
from above. Placed-based thinking often forces such (w)holistic categories upon the 
movement of life by relating to other locations in terms of how they fit into its own 
notion of place and History. Such a process backgrounds the global flows that daily 
intersect all places.  
 Deborah Bird Rose argues almost the exact opposite. She agrees that in a 
transcendent notion of linear time, places are made empty so that a culture of progress 
can be reinscribed on them (Rose 61-62). She favors instead a notion of “eco-place” 
(168) that would help us understand that time is not dictated by humans, but is rather 
                                                       
7 Sandra Harding describes the “tunnel of time” well (25). 
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multi-directional and consists of the interactions between and among relations in a given 
place. Against any notion of linear time, such "eco-place" helps us to realize “co-
mingled times” (26) where “there is no former time/space of wholeness to which we 
might return or which we might resurrect for ourselves. Nor is there a posited future 
wholeness which may yet save us” (24). The same notion of mixed-time opens us to the 
textures of our evolving contexts. While I agree with Rose’s critique of linear time and 
the need for receptivity to the “co-mingled” times of various places a place-based 
identity quickly slips into a monological way of conceiving nature and what ought to be 
done in terms of human interaction with the rest of the natural world. In other words, 
the idea that one finds deep connections with a place suggests a depth that can become 
foundational and thereby naturalizes a specific narrative about place across the face of 
the globe. Place-based ethics opt for extending the concept of the individual (and all that 
entails) to specific locales rather than going for a more biocentric, planetary 
understanding of “nature.” Such a decision is fine as long as it is made clear that place-
based thinking remains just as constructed as other models of the natural world, a reality 
I do not believe place-based thinking very prone to admit.  
 Instead of continuing to base ethics in ontology and metaphysics, and thereby 
universalizing them for all times and all places (a continuation of the fallacy of the 
Modern separation and its ethical handmaiden rooted in sensibilities of place/space), 
perhaps we ought to develop a more ethical concept of time anchored in a network of 
relations, or the sensibilities of space-time and movement. This might produce an ethics 
without foundations, without the purification of categories, and without the 
metaphysics of time. It is no random coincidence that Carolyn Merchant’s book, 
Reinventing Eden (2004), which critiques the arrow of time, whether conceived of as 
progressive or declensionist, ends with a chapter on “relations” in terms of 
contemporary thinking about chaos and complexity. From this perspective, she 
develops her understanding of “partnership ethics.” Merchant attempts to move ethics 
away from the discourse of metaphysics and ontology to the one of contextual relations 
and negotiations. This requires a sensibility of movement and change over that of 
place/space. Moving away from the Modern project of purification, foundational 
thinking, and linear time does not leave us with relativism; rather, it leaves us with 
contextualism. I now turn to some examples of this type of ethics, based upon the 
sensibilities of space-time and movement, or sensibilities that focus on the pace (rather 
than place) of space-time. 
 
The Pace of Planetary Environmental Aesthetics: Points of Departure 
 
Entering a different space-time of thinking and becoming is no small task; and 
this examination cannot be expected to exhaust the topic. Instead, what I propose here 
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should be seen as “points of departure” or catalysts for discussion. Re-thinking the 
categories of purification in terms of hybrids, tricksters, cyborgs, and partners 
(Haraway, Merchant), re-shaping foundational thought in terms of rhizomatic or 
nomadic thought (Deleuze), and re-fashioning linear time and the ethics derived from it 
in terms of the collective (Latour) and planetarity (Spivak), all these approaches may 
offer us a more helpful way to navigate the issues bequeathed to us in this post-colonial 
era of global climate change. My hope is to begin to shift the focus on the ontological 
tropes of enchantment to a focus on an aesthetic choice between “globalization” and 
“planetarity.” In other words, I seek to move the discussion from the Modern, place-
based, ontological choice between “enchanted” and “dis-enchanted” nature to that of a 
pace-based ethical choice of how we relate to and perform with one another as well as 
with the rest of the natural-cultural world. 
 Regarding this shift, the work of Donna Haraway and Carolyn Merchant 
provide good starting points. Both of these thinkers have challenged the Modern project 
of purification of categories. Donna Haraway argues that we only exist in nature-
cultures, that we are hybrids, cyborgs of the natural-cultural and physical-mental, that 
we are machine-biology (Simians, 150-157). There is no getting beyond to any pure 
form; in fact, the purification process leads to violence toward both human and earth 
others. Similarly, Carolyn Merchant scrambles the pure distinctions between active 
history and inactive nature through her understanding of partnership (210-229). Rather 
than agency being contained by one side of the equation, it is shared. The import of both 
of these thinkers is that we begin to realize the contours and textures of our worlds. We 
open up to the idea that we are all hybrids—interactions of nature and culture, past and 
future, the mental and physical—and that no part of these hybrid mixtures dominates 
the other. We must pay attention to the multiplicities that all subject-objects are and 
resist the Modern tendency of abstracting pure categories through backgrounding 
relations.  
 In such a mixed reality, there are no longer any transcendent foundations for 
knowing from which we can recapitulate all life on the planet, the very project of the 
colonizing mind. Rather than ordering minds or alternatively minds getting “in sync” 
with nature, we are, as Deleuze and Guattari argue, rhizomatic and nomadic in our 
thought.8 No pure origin, no foundation exists, but only multiple beginnings. Our 
thoughts do not arise ex nihilo, but emerge from the continuous process of open-ended 
creation. We can find no “whole” already formed within linear time from which we can 
impose foundations. This yet again puts an end to a monotheistic and monological way 
of thinking about reality. Instead, what if the world and our concepts of the world are 
                                                       
8 In their seminal work A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari 
particularly develop the concept of rhizomatic thought in their "Introduction" (3-25) and the one of 
nomadology in Chapter 12 (351-423). 
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like “fragmentary wholes” that remain open (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus 35-36)? We can go in many directions, our thoughts take flight; some will 
become more persuasive than others. This constitutes a move toward a polytheistic or 
at least polydox (see Schneider and Keller) way of understanding reality; this also 
initiates a polyamorous relationship to spaces/places. Crucially here, knowledge is never 
pure and cannot have transcendent foundations; instead knowledge reveals itself as 
contextual, immanent, constructed in nature-cultures, and there are many different 
possibilities for future directions in thought. Such thinking has deep roots not only in 
Postmodern deconstructionism, but also in negative theological traditions.9 Negative and 
apophatic forms of theology focus on the “unknowing” of God/Ultimate Reality rather 
than describing what that reality might be. In a way, negative theology has as much to 
critique in foundational understandings of nature as in foundational understandings of 
God. In one sense, the negative theological tradition that leads to the death of God here 
ends up also calling for the death of “nature.”   
 Instead of linear time founded in concepts of salvation or returning to some sort 
of pure relationship with nature, perhaps we could think of time in reference to the 
“collective” or “planetary becoming”10 (see Latour, Politics of Nature; Spivak). In 
Latour’s collective, the becoming process never ends; rather, there is collecting, breaking 
open the collective, and collecting again, ad infinitum. Instead of the linear project of 
time from beginning to end, time is about the relations among humans as well as between 
humans and the rest of the natural-cultural worlds. Similarly, Gayatri Spivak’s notion of 
the planetary, posited in direct opposition to the project of globalization, opens us onto 
time as relation. Instead of the linear, monological project of universalizing Modern 
ideas over the whole planet, we begin to open onto the many different ways of being-
becoming in the (human and non-human) world and ask how we want to become 
together.  
 Rather than seeking an ontological justification for our ethical and political 
projects, we begin to realize that we are co-creators of the truth-regimes in the worlds in 
which we live. The future is radically not closed to how we might become, and thus 
possibilities for becoming abound. As Latour notes, immanence does not destroy 
transcendence, but opens transcendence up for discussion! “Deprived of the help of 
transcendence, we at first believe we are going to suffocate for want of oxygen; then we 
notice that we are breathing more freely than before: transcendences abound in the 
propositions that are external to the collective” (Latour, Politics 187). In other words, a 
collapse into immanence really allows for us to recognize the relationships that have 
                                                       
9 For recent discussions bringing deconstructionism and apophatic traditions together, see Boesel and 
Keller. 
10 For a closer definition of the concept of "planetarity," see Keller 130. The notion is also developed at 
length in Moore and Rivera. 
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been ignored and backgrounded under the banner of transcendence, thereby opening us 
up to the recognition and creation of different planetary identities.  
 We do not have to remain in the modern refrain; we can begin to march to the 
beat of a different drum, sing different notes, create different scores, and recognize new 
instruments in the planetary band. We do not have to remain locked in the choices 
between a symphony and cacophony, the choices set forth by the false separations of 
Modernity. In reality, these are not choices at all because the symphony merely creates 
its own cacophony through the process of globalization and through voices excluded by 
backgrounding. Imposing order creates chaos: “Violence is central to both conquest and 
to progress” (Rose 4). Perhaps from this radical immanent, planetary perspective, we 
can begin to join in the polyphony of planetary becoming, a polyphony that is ever-
emergent and always becoming, what Ernst Bloch refers to as the “not-yet” (vol 1, 75-
77). 
In this space of response-able becoming, religion and nature become “crossing” 
sites, or vectors for changes in identities (both individual and communal ones). 
Furthermore, epistemology becomes ethical and more about aesthetics and persuasion 
than ontology and metaphysics. The rest of this article will begin describing what a 
planetary ethic grounded in aesthetic persuasion might look like.  
 
On the Road to Nowhere and Everywhere: Developing A Planetary Ethic of 
Aesthetic Persuasion 
 
Again, once one decides to take the leap to epistem-ontology or the realization 
that epistemology and ontology are always already co-implicated, and that thus there is 
no transcendent space from which to make knowledge claims, the option does not have 
to be relativism. Rather, contextuality and a move toward linking knowledge and 
becoming—with ethical rather than ontological ends—presents itself as another path. 
The question of what truths we will live into begins to matter more than what is 
metaphysically or ontologically True. Truth becomes more linked to persuasion—to 
that which compels toward a “better” or “more beautiful” life.  
 
Fashioning Persuasive Aesthetic-Ethics 
 
Knowledge is embedded in projects; knowledge is always for, in many senses, some 
things and not others, and knowers are always formed by their projects, just as they 
shape what they can know. Such shapings never occur in some unearthly realm; they are 
always about the material and meaningful interactions of located humans and 
nonhumans—machines, organisms, people, land, institutions, money, and many other 
things. (Haraway, The Haraway Reader 200) 
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Knowledge always involves shaping, molding, and curtailing information from and 
toward a specific context. In a nutshell, knowledge production is about fashioning. In an 
environmental truth regime that moves beyond the transcendent language of 
enchantment, the question becomes one of how we might fashion a persuasive 
environmental ethic in an increasingly globalized world. Drawing from Spivak's concept 
of planetarity (71-102) and the one of immanence as developed by Deleuze and Guattari 
in most of their work, I argue for a Planetary Environmental Aesthetic, an Eco-Couture 
if you will. As a result of thinking within a truth-regime of radical immanence, a new 
aesthetic imagination can form in the world because there are no longer external, 
universal values/judgments restricting the concepts of beauty, value, and meaning. In 
other words, there is no more “holding on” to that place which seeks to make all else 
capitulate toward its own self-understanding. If “environmental” aesthetics and ethics 
are to be about more than platitudes and self-justification, if they really can constitute 
interrelated processes whose outcome is unknown, thereby mimicking the processes of 
evolving earth systems which they wish to defend, then this human-persuasive, political 
dimension of knowing and being must be taken seriously. This has very real 
implications. This type of immanent aesthetics, taking into account the sensibility of 
movement, may lead to new, ecological aesthetics that re-imagine humans within the rest 
of the natural world and create environmentally sound couture/ truth regimes that are 
persuasive. Granted such a link between aesthetics and ethics does not always lead to 
sound fashion choices, but through an immanent aesthetics, such choices become 
political and can thereby be placed under public scrutiny rather than remain foundations 
for recapitulating what is good/bad, beautiful/ugly, or natural/unnatural. 
 
Fashioning Materials, Ideas, and Symbols 
 
The word "fashion" simply means: to make, shape, manner, or mold. It involves 
people acting together, a making or doing. Understanding humans as “fashioners” is 
another way of seeing human beings as Homo Faber. Both philosophical and religious 
inquiry are fashion-able. Would not one way of describing philosophy simply be to 
define it as inquiry that fashions meaning and answers questions about an ultimate 
reality? Likewise, is this not what religion or the act of re-ligare/ligere supposedly 
concerns itself with: to re-connect, bind together, and to re-read life?  Have both religion 
and philosophy not been about fashioning a life, a way, concepts of who we are, 
concepts of what nature and culture respectively are, etc.?  According to Deleuze, “[t]o 
define something is not to explain what it means but to explicate what it is, i.e. to make 
or produce it in actuality” (Hallward 75). That which we fashion matters. Sociologist 
Georg Simmel, who wrote one of the first major reflective works on fashion in the early 
20th century, also suggests that religion, and I would add philosophy, is involved in the 
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process of creating forms of meaning, value, and beauty. He writes, “It is the subjective 
energy that creates and maintains the religious forms,” or rather fashions them (Varga 
150). Subjects fashion religious forms; among other things, this implies that religious and 
philosophical knowing are constructive enterprises and that some forms, ideas, and 
concepts prove more fashionable than others at times.  
 Roland Barthes views fashion as a form of mythologizing or a “process by 
which the contingent and historical are raised to something necessary and universally 
valid”11 (The Fashion System 269). As such, we can say that both philosophy and 
religious traditions have been part of the fashion industry for a long time, whether 
through rhetoric surrounding what “the good life” is or ought to be, or through 
institutions that provide adherents with a story of salvation and redemption, or as a 
way to make meaning out of the whole of one’s life. Religions, especially, have 
recognized the persuasive power of a sensible aesthetics of movement. Religions have 
ethical commandments, rituals, and traditions to no small degree because they engage 
sight, smell, taste, touch, and sound—the common senses. The engagement of the 
common senses is meant to convert or change identities. Religious paintings, 
architecture, clothing, incense, and even kitsch, have all played a role in persuading their 
adherents to convert and remain loyal.  
If, as I argue, we are co-producers and co-consumers of symbols, if our identities 
are fluid, and if we are always involved in co-self-construction via the consumption of 
symbols, then some attention should be paid to the process by which and toward which 
we produce and consume symbols. From a perspective of radical immanence, religion 
and philosophy offer meanings in very limited contexts: limited because they recognize 
that meanings come, go, and morph through time. Thomas Tweed suggests in his theory 
of religion that the dwelling places of meaning are always already “only for a time” 
(Tweed 81). From a perspective that moves beyond transcendence, meaning is about 
contextual meaning-making practices.  
The idea that true meaning still lies either deep-down or beyond that which is 
passing or moving underpins the Modern search for “origin,” “depth,” or “the 
authentic.” Such quests have caused enough violence, as deconstructionists and post-
colonial scholars have shown. Thus, it may be beneficial to move beyond this search in a 
way that understands better the realities of movement, and in a way that understands 
places as part of one continually changing “plane of immanence.”12   
 
                                                       
11 On this point, see also Svendsen 68. 
12 Deleuze and Guattari call this plane of immanence nature: “This plane has nothing to do with a form 
or a figure, nor with a design or a function. Its unity has nothing to do with a ground buried deep within 
things, nor with an end or a project in the mid of God. Instead, it is a plane upon which everything is 
laid out. […] A Plane of immanence or univocality opposed to analogy” (254). 
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Radical Immanence: Planetary Possibilities beyond Reason and Romance 
 
Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, especially, there was a significant move 
in philosophy (a fashionable move), following Nietzsche, to see to it that the Death of 
God would be complete. This expression means several things, from the death of a 
Subjective Ordering Principle in the universe called “God,” to the death of all 
transcendence. These attempts can be seen as an effort to bring thought “down to 
earth,” and, as another endeavor in a long line of apophatic and negative 
theologies/philosophies to point out the limits of human knowledge. In parallel with this 
death, many Romantic philosophers and materialists of all stripes began trying to use 
the category of “Nature” for the basis of truth and meaning in the world. One might 
think of this trend as the Enlightenment move from Reason-following-Revelation to that 
of Reason-discovering-Natural-Laws. In the wake of thinkers such as John Locke, 
philosophy embraces the idea of a world created orderly by a God that sets up these 
natural laws and endows the human intellect (the Imago) with the ability to “discover” 
these laws through reason. The shift in rhetoric consisted, generally, in moving from an 
idea, truth, or value as being “God-given” to that of an idea being “Natural.” The 
Romantic shift away from rationalization and toward phenomenological approach still 
seeks this genuine connection to “Nature,” even while pointing out the limitations of 
Reason and human intellectual projects (culture and technology). In fact, much of 
environmental aesthetics today is still based upon this shift by Romantics and 
Transcendentalists to find foundations for truth, value, meaning, and beauty in and/or 
through the natural world. 
 In the last half-century, not surprisingly, the idea of “nature” as a solid 
foundation has been challenged once again.13 However, many forms of rhetoric still draw 
from foundational discourse. In a discourse about beauty that remains grounded in some 
sort of transcendent space, this discussion would fall under the debate about surface vs. 
depth. Couching ethical negotiation in terms of surface and depth (a place-based 
approach) helps to oppositionally define what is important to each camp by 
systematically leaving out the things claimed by the other and staking an ethical decision 
in some place: surface (newness) or depth (romantic past). This ontological decision 
diverts attention away from the reality of movement and change. In moving toward an 
aesthetic of pace, the conversation also moves toward that of the rate of change. The 
debate would oppose something like the “precautionary principle” (do not change / hold 
on to a romantic past) to the worshiping of newness (new is Good). This opposition is 
                                                       
13 See, for instance: Butler; Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature; and Morton. For a scientist’s queering of 
“nature as foundation,” see Roughgarden.  
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luckily already found in ethical decisions that rely on navigating between continuity and 
change.  
 I do not blame environmentalism for its disdain of contemporary consumer 
culture and rejection of the worship of newness: any counter-cultural movement 
involves refusal of the status quo, and there are serious problems with worshiping 
newness. Nor do I blame those who are persuaded by an aesthetic of newness: again, 
many good reasons exist to reject the worship of the past. What often gets lost in this 
opposition is that both positions suffer from the same blindness: they fail to see that 
the important ethical questions should be focused on pace rather than place. The pivotal 
question, then, is not whether to be fashionable/fake/surface or other-
worldly/genuine/deep, but rather what amounts to a viable pace of planetary movement. 
Teresa Brennan describes this as the necessity to determine what the “regenerative 
time” of the planet is, and to re-think human cultures within that space-time (Brennan 
123-129). 
 Another point of interaction that opens up when we shift the focus from place 
to pace is the discourse of embodiment. I need not recount the ways in which 
transcendent ideals are detrimental to real bodies. When enchanted, place-based 
environmentalism moves from its idealized concept of nature to real bodies, it is often in 
order to define what is “natural” and what is “unnatural.” If we follow Foucault, Butler, 
Haraway, and many others who have looked at the concepts of body and nature, we 
might say to both camps that we need embodiment without dictating what is and is not 
“natural” or “ideal.” Instead, perhaps we require discourses of embodiment focused on 
the exchange between assembled identities in transition (trans-identities). As Helen 
Cisoux notes, “If you remove all of the clothes, you will not find a ‘natural’ body but a 
body that is shaped by fashion: the body is not more ‘natural than the clothes it wears’” 
(qtd. in Svendsen 77). This quote has contextual implications for environmentalists: pay 
attention to how subjects co-construct embodied identities without the distinctions of 
natural/unnatural! In other words, environmental visions which throw off culture to find 
genuine nature are as misplaced as attempts to throw off nature for pure culture. Nature 
and culture co-define what it means to be human; we are always-already in this mix and 
this mix returns to affect the rest of the natural world. From these deconstructive 
elements towards fashioning, how to move toward what we might call an open, evolving 
planetary aesthetic? This is precisely the question to be examined in the final part of 
this article. 
 
Ethics on the Move: An Open, Evolving Planetary Aesthetic 
 
Many thinkers have been working on fashioning a new set of symbols for a 
post-Natural and post-Transcendent world. In such a world, “there is nothing outside 
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being in relation to which being might be” (Hallward 15). Furthermore, the distinctions 
that rely on this “outside,” such as surface vs. depth, public vs. private, use vs. non-
use, and object vs. subject, among others, are eroded. What replaces the tropes of this 
“outside” formally known as objective facts, truth, value, and meaning is persuasive 
knowledge toward different ways of becoming in the world. This does not amount to a 
slip into relativism, but to a recognition that all things in our histories that have posed as 
Truths, as Universal, or as Objective value and knowledge claims, have taken their role 
in societies through power and persuasion: “All history is really the history of 
perception, and what we make history with is the matter of a becoming, not the subject 
matter of a story” (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 347). In a messy reality, 
“there is no outside nor is there an inner sanctum in which I can take refuge from 
univocal forces” (Berleant 7). In this construction, the realm of Nature and the realm of 
Ideas/Thought are not distinct or separate from one another; neither do they have 
priority over one another. As Deleuze notes, “thought and nature will coexist as parallel 
expressions of a single plane of consistency or a single line of variation” (Hallward 11; 
also see Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 338). From within this radical 
immanence, there exists no Origin or End, which would suggest some place of 
rest/transcendence, but rather reality unfolds more like a rhizome that can shoot off in 
many directions with no clear beginning or end (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus 1-25). From within this radical immanence, too, “[m]aking a clean slate, 
starting or beginning again from ground zero, seeking a beginning or a foundation—all 
imply a false conception of voyage and movement” (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus 25). Moreover, they do not even make sense from an immanent perspective. 
This “pure immanence” means that a distinction between regimes of truth becomes 
ethical/aesthetic rather than ontological/metaphysical.14  
 It is important for the future of environmentalism to include the fashioning of a 
concept of nature that does not rely merely on place, if predictions about global climate 
change are true and the very places we seek to preserve begin to change. We will need an 
environmentalism that reveals itself just as mobile, just as nomadic as the ground from 
which it emerges.15 Perhaps part of the reason why the “environmental movement” has 
been less effective in persuading the world towards a planetary ethic is because it 
appears out-of-step (like many extant religious traditions) with the movement and 
change of meanings resulting from the process of globalization. This process is 
                                                       
14 On “pure immanence,” see Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy, chapter 2 (35-60). The plane of 
immanence “presents only events, that is, possible worlds as concepts, and other people as expressions 
of possible worlds or conceptual personae” (47-48). See also later in the same book: “Thinking consists 
in stretching out a plane of immanence that absorbs the earth (or rather, ‘adsorbs’ it)” (88).  
15 This type of nomadism is evolving and contextual. As Deleuze and Guattari put it: “The coupling of 
the place and the absolute is achieved not in a centered, oriented globalization or universalization but in 
an infinite succession of local operations” (A Thousand Plateaus 383).  
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characterized by movement and exchange of ideas, places, products, materials, rather 
than stasis or staying in place. Consider what some call the Millennial generation. The 
expression refers to the students who were born in the richest third of the world during 
the 1990s and who fill college and university campuses at this date. These students have 
never lived in a world without cell phones, the internet, and all of the fast-movement of 
materials and resources around the globe that both of those technologies imply. They 
are more likely to text than to call, and to know how to build a website than construct a 
three-point essay. They are more likely to be comfortable with “on-line” interactions 
than their professors. For these students, “nature” is often mediated through various 
technologies. Other, less privileged people who are not the beneficiaries of such 
technologies are nevertheless also affected (often negatively) by them, as their places 
and identities are changed through the movement of resources and as information 
“invades” every region of the planet. This level of mobility creates a shift in what it 
means to be human vis-à-vis the rest of the natural world. Ursula Heise captures this 
shift well when she discusses the move from the image of the earth as the “little blue 
ball” to that of “Google earth” (Heise, 17-67). Imagining the single earth image no longer 
suffices, as this image distorts the ways in which movement of energy and materials 
affects places differently. To make a persuasive environmental argument, one must take 
into account this “space-time” crunch out of which, from the present moment into the 
foreseeable future, each new generation will emerge. This is a planet and a world marked 
by change. Ignoring that fact and opting for a romantic return to the past (a past which 
has no grounding for more and more people) would be just as irresponsible as embracing 
it fully and worshiping the new. 
 Environmentalism must learn to de-contextualize and re-contextualize, to become 
more imaginative—and more persuasive—by taking on a new pace that begins from the 
present and moves forward to alternative future visions, rather than by imposing the 
past and rejecting the newly emergent altogether. Part of this discussion should include 
some reflection on the beauty that is also found in tragedy.16 A pollution sunset, the 
rainbow in a slick of oil on the water, models who sacrifice their own health and bodies 
for a particular conception of female perfection, and so many shiny consumer products 
that (like birds) we use for nesting, these are all forms of tragic beauty. One cannot deny 
these sorts of beauty, but we must temper that with understanding their tragic side: the 
pace at which they are produced outstrips the flourishing of planetary life. Contrast this 
with the beauty of the Grand Canyon, of biodiversity, of communities making living 
wages and nurturing one another, of consuming in ways that promote planetary 
flourishing, and the difference between the pace of slow beauty and that of fast beauty 
emerges. Newness is beautiful, but newness unto itself can lead to much destruction: 
                                                       
16 I want to thank Emily Silvermann for a conversation that began to initiate this line of thinking. 
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there is no creatio ex nihilo; rather creation also always involves some amount of 
destruction. Likewise, there is beauty in the past, but the past cannot be held onto 
without killing the ongoing process of creatio continua. In between the worship of the 
past and the worship of newness lies the pace of planetary flourishing. 
 
Conclusion: Can a Planetary Aesthetic ever be "en Vogue"? 
 
Since I began with the language of enchantment (as understood spiritually), I will 
end with an etymological reflection on a word from the fashion industry that might 
capture better a pace-based ethic, namely vogue. The etymological origin of the French 
"voguer" means to row, sway, or set sail. The hope for every new fashioning is that it 
will be en vogue, just as the hope for every song (cantare) is that it will “catch on.” 
There is always a possibility of failure, of sinking, of not being heard, of not swaying, of 
not sailing. What causes a fashion—philosophical, religious, or material—to be in 
vogue? A planetary pace-based aesthetic should begin with this very question—one 
pertaining to truth, meaning, and value, one that has become contextual, with text, with 
time, with space, and with material others. Environmental rhetoric and the 
environmental movement should also be asking this question: how can we fashion a 
vision that will be en vogue? As Svendsen puts it: “We must choose a lifestyle and, as a 
style, the choice is basically an aesthetic one” (141). I have been arguing throughout that 
an aesthetic based upon radical immanence will focus our attention more on the 
movements of everyday lives rather than on the abstract concept of place. Such 
transcendent notions as “the individual,” “place,” “nature,” or “God,” help foster an 
illusion that there exists a place in which things do not move, which remains somehow 
beyond the flux of everyday exchanges of materials and energies. This, I have contended 
here, may be a source of the reification of life, and may actually lead to ecological and 
social violence rather than ecological thriving and justice. Further, an environmental 
aesthetic and corresponding ethic based upon radical immanence will help focus us onto 
the contours of the changing planet better than one based upon a return to a pure nature 
or “genuine connection” with place. Such metaphors always already suggest that 
humans are at some level disconnected from the rest of the natural world. Metaphors 
that belie this miss the importance of connection in persuading bodies toward visions of 
a planetary future. The environmental community should become more concerned with 
questions of the pace of aesthetic movement in order to bring people towards its 
vision—its new, more fluid "truth regime"—of “the good life.” Song, voyage, fashioning, 
and religion are all nouns of action and can be fruitful in an analysis of the pace of the 
planetary. 
 Concepts are like sails: this pace of the planetary needs enough wind to "set 
sail" and be "in vogue." If that wind is not there, the boat sits dead in the water: it makes 
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no connections. This may be fine from an Enlightenment, foundational perspective—
who cares whether an idea is persuasive when it is, by definition, already either true or 
not, right or wrong? But, from a perspective of radical immanence, truths must 
endlessly perform the task of persuasion and the concepts fashioned have to pay 
attention to the Zeitgeist. There is no more safe space from which to judge on-high! 
 According to Schiller, the purpose of the “aesthetic instinct” in human beings is 
“to create order or to give a form to social interaction without suppressing our sensual 
instincts and drives” (qtd. in Gronow 155). As such, this instinct can function as an 
important component that bridges our ordering concepts and symbols with an already 
evolving, open, planetary world. Otherwise, symbols serve to reify life and thus lead to 
some form of tyranny. Many utopian, science fiction, and totalitarian scenarios tend to 
leave out fashion: all are "uniformed" because, apparently, time has “arrived.” In this 
rhizomatic, immanent reality which I am describing and which requires that the 
persuasive be endlessly renewed, there is no arrival: “Fashion never is—it is always in a 
state of becoming” (Svendsen 34). Like “nature,” fashion is never in stasis, but always 
changing; so it is with the process of human becoming toward meaning-full visions of a 
planetary community.  
 
Works Cited 
 
Adams, William and Martin Mulligan, eds. Decolonizing Nature: Strategies for 
Conservation in a Postcolonial Era. London: Earthscan, 2003. Print. 
Barthes, Roland. The Fashion System. Trans. Matthew Ward and Richard Howard. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Print. Trans. of Système de la mode, 
1967. 
Bergson, Henri. An Introduction to Metaphysics. Trans. TE Hulme. Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing, 1999. Print. Trans. of Introduction à la métaphysique, 1903. 
Berleant, Arnold. Environment and the Arts: Perspectives on Environmental Aesthetics. 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002. Print. 
Bloch, Ernst. The Principle of Hope. 3 vols. Trans. Nevile Plaice, Steven Plaice, and Paul 
Knight Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986. Print. Trans. of Das Prinzip Hoffnung, 
1938-1947 
Boesel, Chris and Catherin Keller, eds. Apophatic Bodies: Negative Theology, 
Incarnation, and Relationality. New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2009. 
Print. 
Brennan, Teresa. Exhausting Modernity: Grounds for a New Economy. New York: 
Routledge, 2000. Print. 
Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble. 1990. New York: Routledge, 1999. Print.  
V
ol 2, N
o 2 
Author: Bauman, Whitney A.;  Title: From the Enchantment of Nature to Fashioning a 
Persuasive Planetary Ethic 
 
38 
© Ecozon@ 2011     ISSN 2171-9594 
Deleuze, Gilles. Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life. Trans. Ann Boyman. New York: 
Zone Books, 2001. Print. 
---. The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. Trans. Tom Conley. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1993. Print. Trans. of Le Pli: Leibniz et le baroque, 1988.  
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. Print. 
Trans. of Mille plateaux: capitalisme et schizophrénie, 1980. 
---. What is Philosophy? Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996. Print. Trans. of Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 
1991. 
Goodchild, Phillip. “Why is Philosophy so Compromised with God?” Deleuze and 
Religion. Ed. Mary Bryden. London: Routledge, 2001. 156-166. Print. 
Guattari, Félix. The Three Ecologies. Trans by Ian Pindor and Paul Sutton. London, 
UK: Continuum, 2000. Print. Trans. of Les trois écologies, 1989 
Gronow, Jukka. The Sociology of Taste. London, UK: Routledge, 1997. Print. 
Hallward, Peter. Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation. New York: 
Verso, 2006. Print. 
Haraway, Donna. The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant 
Otherness. New York, NY: Prickly Paradigm, 2003. Print. 
---. The Haraway Reader. New York, NY: Routledge, 2004. Print. 
---. Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New York, NY: 
Routledge, 1991. Print. 
Harding, Sandra. Is Science Multicultural: Postcolonialisms, Feminisms, and Ecology. 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998. Print. 
Heise, Ursula. Sense of Place and Sense of Planet: The Environmental Imagination of the 
Global. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008. Print. 
Keller, Catherine. God and Power: Counter-Apocalyptic Journeys. Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress, 2005. Print. 
Latour, Bruno. Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy. Trans. 
Catherine Porter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. Print. Trans. of 
Politiques de la nature. Comment faire entrer les sciences en démocratie, 1999. 
---. We Have Never Been Modern. Trans. Catherine Porter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1993. Print. Trans. of Nous n'avons jamais été modernes. Essai 
d'antrhopologie symétrique, 1991. 
McGrath, Alister. The Re-enchantment of Nature: The Denial of Religion and the 
Ecological Crisis. New York, NY: Doubleday, 2002. Print. 
Merchant, Carolyn. Reinventing Eden: The Fate of Nature in Western Culture. Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 2004. Print. 
V
ol 2, N
o 2 
Author: Bauman, Whitney A.; Title: From the Enchantment of Nature to Fashioning a 
Persuasive Planetary Ethic 
 
39 
© Ecozon@ 2011     ISSN 2171-9594 
Miller, James. “Religion, Nature and Modernization in China.” Technology, Trust and 
Religion. Ed. Willem B. Drees. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2009. 107-122. 
Print. 
Miller, Jerome. In the Throe of Wonder: Intimations of the Sacred in a PostModern 
World. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992. Print. 
Moore, Stephen D., and Mayra Rivera, eds. Planetary Loves: Spivak, Postcoloniality, 
and Theology. New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2010. Print. 
Morton, Timothy. Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics. 
Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007. Print. 
Plumwood, Val. “The Concept of a Cultural Landscape: Nature, Culture, and Agency in 
the Land.” Ethics and the Environment 11.2 (2006): 115-150. Print. 
---. Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason. New York, NY: Routledge, 
2002. Print. 
---. “Toward a Progressive Naturalism.” Recognizing the Authority of Nature. Ed. 
Thomas Heyd. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005. 25-53. Print. 
Rose, Deborah Bird. Reports from a Wild Country: Ethics for Decolonization. Sydney, 
NSW: University of New South Wales Press, 2004. Print. 
Roughgarden, Joan. Evolution’s Rainbow: Diversity, Gender, and Sexuality in Nature 
and People. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004. Print. 
Schneider, Laurel and Catherine Keller, eds. Polydoxy: Theology of Multiplicity and 
Relation. New York, NY: Routledge, 2011. Print. 
Spivak, Gayatri. The Death of a Discipline. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
2003. Print. 
Svendsen, Lars. Fashion: A Philosophy. Trans. John Irons. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 2006. Print. Trans. of Mote: Et Filosofisk Essay, 2004. 
Tweed, Thomas. Crossing and Dwelling: A Theory of Religion. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2006. Print. 
Varga, Ivan. “Georg Simmel: Religion and Spirituality.” A Sociology of Spirituality. Eds. 
Kieran Flanagan and Peter Lupp. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007. 145-160, Print. 
 
 
  
